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Abstract
Aim: To set out a policy analysis of food taxes as a way of influencing food
consumption and behaviour.
Design: The study draws on examples of food taxes from the developed world
imposed at national and local levels. Studies were identified from a systemised search
in six databases with criteria designed to identity articles of policy relevance.
Results: The dominant approach identified from the literature was the imposition of
food taxes on food to raise general revenue, such as Value Added Tax in the European
Union. Food taxes can be applied in various ways, ranging from attempts to directly
influence behaviour to those which collect taxes for identified campaigns on healthy
eating through to those applied within closed settings such as schools. There is a case
for combining taxes of unhealthy foods with subsidies of healthy foods. The evidence
from the literature concerning the use and impact of food taxes on food behaviour is
not clear and those cases identified are mainly retrospective descriptions of the
process. Many food taxes have been withdrawn after short periods of time due to
industry lobbying.
Conclusions for policy: Small taxes with the clear purpose of promoting the health of
key groups, e.g. children, are more likely to receive public support. The focus of
many tax initiatives is unclear; although they are generally aimed at consumers,
another focus could be food manufacturers, using taxes and subsidies to encourage
the production of healthier foods, which could have an effect at a population level.
Further consideration needs to be given to this aspect of food taxes. Taxing food (and
subsidies) can influence food behaviour within closed systems such as schools and
the workplace.
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Recent concerns about the burden of diseases such as
coronary heart disease, diabetes and obesity, both globally
and in the UK, have raised questions about which policy
approaches might best address the issues of healthy
eating. AWorld Health Organization/Food and Agriculture
Organization report1 sees pricing and the cost of healthy
foods as being key elements in the prevention equation,
driven in part by the rise in diet-related non-communic-
able diseases. Suggested solutions have ranged from calls
for more restrictions on the advertising of energy-dense
and fatty foods to the promotion of physical activity2.
Another proposed solution has been what has become
colloquially known as a ‘fat tax’. Herein we aim to extend
the debate beyond this narrow focus to look at the
possible role of taxes on food in general as a population-
based measure to promote healthier eating. Such an
approach was reported as under consideration, in early
drafts of a report3, by the UK Government as a part of a raft
of measures to combat unhealthy eating, although the
proposals were omitted from the final report4, 5. While this
displays one of the problems of any proposed food tax –
its unpopularity – this should not stop us from examining
the possible implementation and implications of such a
policy. This paper sets out the arguments for and against a
food tax, reviews the existing evidence and locates these
within a policy context before drawing some conclusions
for public health nutrition.
History shows that food taxes have not been popular
with citizens throughout the centuries and have been a
prime contributor to riots6. English history is full of reports
of riots where increases in food prices resulted in ‘mob
behaviour’7. The European continent similarly has a
history of food protests related to increases in food prices,
with one of the best documented instances being the 1919
food riots in Italy8. Newer food protest has tended to focus
on global inequity and unfairness of a food system to
indigenous producers6.
The background to current increases in the burden of
diseases related to food intake can be traced to higher
overall energy intake/lower energy expenditure, or some
combination of the two, and the consumption of energy-
dense as opposed to nutrient-dense foods. The debates
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polarise between those who favour explanations as rooted
in the behaviours of individuals and those who see
solutions in more structuralist terms (see Ashton9 for the
former view and Lang10 for the latter). The tension that
exists here lies in the anomaly that the structuralists are
more likely to support taxes on food, whereas those who
see the prime responsibility as individual are more likely
to oppose taxes. In reality, the causes are a complex
interplay of both food intake and energy expenditure
issues.
The present article sets out the existing knowledge and
evidence base for a ‘food tax’ and the implications for
public health nutrition. We start by describing the study
methodology and then examining what is meant by a food
tax before moving on to analysing the evidence of the
impact of a food tax on behaviour and concluding with
some recommendations for public health nutrition. We
have included examples from practice to illustrate the
issues.
Study design
This article results from a request to present a paper on ‘Fat
taxes: implications for policy makers and consumers’ to
the 13th Annual Conference of European Food Law in
2004, the overall topic of which was ‘The Challenges
Ahead: From Obesity to Food Safety’.
The analysis draws on examples of food taxes from the
developed world. Studies were identified from existing
databases. An Internet search was undertaken of ERIC,
MEDLINE, Busine/ss Source Premier, Social Sciences
Citation Index (SSCI), SCI-Expanded, and Arts and
Humanities Citation Index (AandHCI), using the software
packages Reference Manager version 9 (www.refman.-
com/) and Thomson Research Soft Endnote 5 (www.end-
note.com/). We employed various combinations of the
following search terms in a number of strategies: fat, taxes,
food taxes, tax on food and fiscal policy, from material
published between the years 1995 and 2003 in English.
The search was conducted in January/February 2004.
These searches identified several hundred references from
the international literature. The following four-fold system
of classification was used to rank papers to be included in
the literature review according to the level of quality of
evidence they presented:
. Level 1: a study, modelling, survey or systematic review,
often employing either randomised controlled, quasi-
experimental, intervention versus control/comparison
group or pre-test/post-test design, with an emphasis on
influencing the price of food and food behaviour or
choice.
. Level 2: a study, survey or review of dietary/nutritional
behaviour allowing the targeting of certain high-risk
categories or groups with specific educational or dietary
interventions of the aetiology of nutrition-related
conditions (obesity, coronary heart disease, diabetes)
using monetary or fiscal measures designed to influence
healthy eating; a non-systematic review of relevant
subject material and professional/government nutri-
tional guidelines or recommendations for fiscal policy
related to food.
. Level 3: well-presented qualitative material of the
descriptive/anecdotal variety, enabling the formation of
pricing strategies for effective healthy eating in settings
such as workplaces or schools.
. Level 4: subject relevance but very general in its
approach or presented too little data to be of more than
general value, e.g. reviews or descriptive accounts of
food choice with an element of pricing strategies to
influence food behaviour; short topical accounts of
different schemes or initiatives, sometimes web-based,
and letters, editorials, comments or critiques in journals
or newspapers offering informed views or opinions.
These were then subjected to a second level of selection
based upon title relevance and/or abstract relevance,
which reduced the size of the original search database to a
total of some 200 references. We found that few studies
met the criteria of level 1 or level 2; the majority were
descriptive and generally described policy in action, very
often without evaluation or research built in. This
produced 34 references for potential inclusion, which
were then subjected to a final level of selection based on
policy relevance and application. The criteria used here
were again four-fold:
1. Contained details of purpose and implementation.
2. Was subject to evaluation/research.
3. The main or a clear part of the tax implementation was
food-related.
4. Contained details of the policy implementation of the
food tax.
The literature review was systemised to achieve a level of
consistency, transparency and rigor11. This reduced the
number of papers to be requested and read at full paper to
eight references in total9,12–18. A further two sources (an
article and a book)19,20 were subsequently identified from
scanning reference lists in relevant papers and later
included in the final count, resulting in a total of 10
references being the source for the paper and presen-
tation. It should be pointed out that given constraints of
time and budget, a full and comprehensive search of the
reference/bibliographic lists could not be carried out. We
report here only on studies which met the criteria for level
1 and level 2 quality of evidence above and which further
met the four policy criteria set out above.
A working paper was presented at the 13th Annual
European Food Law Conference, Brussels, 29–30 June
2004, by one of the authors (M.C.); the present paper is
based on feedback and discussion from this conference,
which contained both representatives from industry and
Food taxes and public health nutrition 1243
government policy-makers21. Following the conference
we had discussions with a number of government bodies
and officials who contacted us asking for more details; we
took these as opportunities for further discussion on the
issues of food taxes. Some of these individuals have used
the ideas presented in the original working paper to
inform their own policy development (see the report from
the Swedish National Food Administration and the
National Institute of Public Health as an example)22.
Findings
What are food taxes?
What is a food tax? The literature showed that the term is
used to cover a range of definitions and purposes. There
was some conflation of the terms ‘fat tax’ and ‘food tax’,
and many of the articles identified initially in the first scan
were reactions and commentaries against the imposition
of a ‘fat tax’ or ‘sin tax’. These were often responses from
the food industry and political conservatives, and were
focused on choice and freedom and the danger of the
nanny state. The majority of the literature talked of ‘fat
taxes’ in a conceptual or theoretical way as opposed to
being empirically based. The focus of many of the articles
was on personal freedom, using fat taxes and restrictions
on tobacco smoking as examples of restrictions on
personal freedom. These generally fell into level 4 ranking
for quality of evidence and were neither evidenced-based
nor directly policy-relevant; as a body of work, however,
they displayed the objections to the imposition of a food or
fat tax. One of the exceptions was the article by Ashton9,
which partially addressed food taxes as well as advertising
bans and was evidence-based.
Some example of taxes levied on food
The imposition of taxes on food was generally in one of
the following four ways:
1. By raising general revenue as in Valued Added Tax
(VAT) in the European Union (EU) or a general service
tax (GST) as in Australia.
2. By extending VAT to some foods such as those high in
fat content and using this hypothecated revenue to
fund prevention initiatives (i.e. the so-called ‘fat tax’).
3. By imposing taxes directly on categories of foodstuffs
to impact directly on behaviour with an additional
function identified for revenues, with some or all or the
revenues being earmarked for prevention activities.
4. By imposing taxes directly on certain foodstuffs with
the intent of impacting directly on behaviour, with no
specific function for revenues.
With approach number 3 above, the examples we found
were generally more concerned with raising revenues as
opposed to directly influencing behaviour, or the impact
on behaviour was not measured or evaluated. The first
approach was the most common approach to taxes on
food, with examples of taxes on food to raise general
revenues without the intention of influencing food
behaviour. Nevertheless they are presented here as ways
we can learn from. Regulatory regimes such as VAT
sometimes target food but they are not conceived of as a
food tax per se: they are really a general tax which happens
to include food. Their current mechanisms are so complex
that their impact on healthy choice is hard to determine. In
the UK, VAT is added to some ‘treat foods’ (such as ice
cream, carbonated drinks and confectionery) whereas
other treat foods (such as cakes, cake bars, Jaffa cakes,
cookies and plain biscuits) are zero-rated. But in the
labyrinthine regulations that cover VAT in the UK, the
addition of ‘chocolate buttons’ to any of these zero-rated
items would result in VAT being applied. Across the EU the
situation is even more complex with no uniformity of
rates. Some countries have a single rate of VAT for
foodstuffs (e.g. Denmark at 25%), while others have two
(e.g. the UK at 0%, 17.5%) or three (e.g. Ireland at 0%,
4.3%, 13.5%). Spain, Ireland, Italy and Luxembourg
impose what is known as a ‘super-reduced’ VAT (less
than 5%) on food products. In Ireland, a zero rate is
applied for food and drink for human consumption,
although this excludes soft drinks, ice cream and
confectionery12.
In Australia, a new Goods and Services Tax (GST) was
introduced on most products and services in 2000 to
replace a number of indirect taxes. Basic foods were
excluded as were hot takeaway foods, prepared foods, fast
foods, confectionery, savoury snacks, bakery products, ice
cream and biscuits (J Coveney, personal correspondence,
2004).
Questions arise as to the mechanism that can be used to
apply general taxes to the area of food to influence food
choice either directly or indirectly13. Suggestions include
using the mechanism of sales taxes such as VAT or GST and
extending them to cover those foods which are currently
exempt but have a high fat content, such as butter, whole
milk and biscuits, or categories of food such as snacks or
those consumed as takeaways. Another way is to define
unhealthy foods, non-essentials or non-core items, foods
sold or prepared in certain ways. In practice this was
found to be applied through distinguishing ‘wants’ as
opposed to ‘needs’ – so certain categories of products
(like carbonated drinks) were not classed as needs or
essential to the requirements of daily living15. There is
such a precedent already established with VAT. In the EU,
Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy and the UK apply a lower
rate of VAT to drinks considered essential such as tea,
coffee and milk and a higher rate on drinks that are not,
such as soft drinks. However, France, Spain and Sweden
apply the same VAT rate across all drink categories14.
The imposition of food taxes was also seen by some as
sending an important symbolic message to the public15. In
much the same way that many anti-smoking initiatives
have been important for their symbolic value, the value of
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a food tax may be to send a clear message that the
government is concerned about the issues. Despite
references to the possibility of Ireland implementing a
fat tax3,15, the views of the then Irish Minister for Health
were reported23 as:
The Minister for Health and Children has ruled out the
introduction of a tax in junk food saying ‘long terms strategies’
are needed to tackle Ireland’s growing rates of obesity.
This comes from within a country and from a minister who
successfully introduced a smoking ban in the workplace,
and some have noted that an opportunity has been missed
to show high-level commitment to the promotion of
healthier eating.
Many of the examples illustrated how the state collects
taxes from foodstuffs rather than demonstrating how food
taxes might be applied to influence food behaviour and
consumption. They show that food is subject to a tax of
sorts, although its purpose is to raise general revenues. In
Sweden and Norway, imports of soft drinks and
confectionary are subject to VAT of 7.14%12,13. In Norway,
this can be related to their overall national food and
nutrition policy which sets out four main goals:
1. To encourage a health-promoting diet, reducing fat
consumption, especially saturated fats, and replacing
them with polyunsaturated fats, whole grains and
vegetables.
2. To promote domestic food production and reduce
food imports, increasing national self-sufficiency from
39% of total calories to 52% by 1990.
3. To promote agricultural development in the country’s
less advantaged areas and outlying regions, with due
regard to preserving the environmental resource base.
4. To contribute to world food security by promoting
production and consumption in poor countries.
So, in Norway (not part of the EU), taxes are related to
wider environmental and social issues and are (as
currently devised) closer to a ‘calorie’ tax than a ‘fat’ tax,
as some foods will naturally be high in fat and others low
and these may not be an adequate description of their
healthiness or otherwise12.
In the USA there are numerous examples of local taxes
at a city or state level which are generally concerned with
generating income as opposed to influencing behaviour;
these are generally applied to categories of food or drink
as opposed to being based directly on the nutritional
content of food. Jacobson and Brownell15 report that the
soft drinks and snack taxes imposed in 18 states and one
major city in the USA raise approximately $1 billion
annually. For example, Arkansas raised $40 million
annually from a tax of about 2 cents per 12-oz can of
soft drink. In Maryland in 1992 the imposition of taxes on
snack foods led to a reported $500 000 drop in sales for
Frito-Lay (the potato crisp maker). California introduced a
snack food tax in 1991 where popped popcorn and Milky
Way bars were taxed but unpopped popcorn and frozen
Milky Way ice cream bars were exempt. An entire cake
was tax-free but a slice taxable. This tax resulted in an
estimated 10% drop in the sales of snack foods; price
elasticity was estimated at 21.21, indicating that demand
may be sensitive to small increases in the price of snack
foods. Revenue generated from the tax was not significant,
jobs were threatened and under pressure from the food
industry the tax was repealed.
In their report on obesity, JP Morgan16 outline the
following four examples of food taxes (p. 19):
. Arkansas, Washington and West Virginia impose special
taxes on soft drinks; Minnesota charges sales tax on
candy, chewing gum and ice cream; and Texas imposes
a candy tax.
. A Maryland proposal would make it illegal for
restaurants that sell soft drinks not to sell sugar-free
beverages as well (violators would face a $500 fine).
. In Connecticut, a bill was filed to repeal a 6% sales tax
exemption for confectionery sold to college cafeterias,
senior centres and day-care centres.
. California tried to raise taxes to finance programmes to
fight obesity. In early 2002 California attempted to
impose a levy of $0.21 per gallon of soda and $2 per
gallon of concentrate. This ‘soda tax’ would have
generated $342 million a year in revenues to be shared
between schools that stopped selling soda on their
campuses, the State Department of Health Services to
promote nutrition and exercise, and hospitals/clinics/
trauma centres. The bill was amended several times
before being defeated by the Senate Education
Committee in spring 2002.
The above examples of schemes show that most of
the taxes are imposed on categories of foods (soft
drinks/candy or sweets) as opposed to being related to the
nutrient content of individual foods, and that they are
imposed in micro-situations such as schools or canteens,
vending machines or fast-food restaurants. In general,
taxes are applied as a flat rate or as a percentage of the
retail price. As an alternative approach, food advertising
could be the focus of taxation on the basis that the majority
of existing food advertising is promoting the types of foods
that are implicated in snacking culture, one of the major
contributors to rising obesity13,15,17.
Evidence for the influence of food taxes on
behaviour
The literature identified under this heading consisted of
two papers, both of which were based on a modelling
approach13,17. Both of these were judged to fit into level 1
quality of evidence. A paper by Marshall17 claimed that the
imposition of a fiscal food tax could help prevent 1000
deaths a year in the UK. Marshall based his analysis on the
premise that VAT on whole milk, cheese, butter, etc. could
reduce premature deaths by 900–1000 per year. To do this
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he made some assumptions about their price elasticities,
suggesting that whole milk has an elasticity of21.0 since it
has close substitutes in the form of skimmed
and semi-skimmed milk, whereas cheese (estimated
elasticity 20.5) and butter (20.7) have fewer direct
substitutes and so have lower price elasticities. Responders
to this article debated the impact of tax on food choice and
saw the solution in the development of a new generation of
functional foods for consumers, focusing on the negative,
regressive impact that such taxes have on the poor24.
Marshall’s analysis was taken further by Leicester and
Windmeijer13 from the Institute for Fiscal Studies. They
modelled the impact of a fat tax on nutrients purchased and
the financial implications. Across all income groups, the
amountofnutrientspurchasedchanges littlebetween those
on high incomes and those on low incomes, because the
amount of fat, sodium and cholesterol consumed does not
vary much between the different income groups. They
found that the impactof anaverage fat taxacross the income
quintileswouldbeas seen inFig. 1.Theyalso suggested that
contexts may be important in the imposition of taxes, a
similar finding to that of French and colleagues18,19. So for
example it might be easier to control for pricing variations
within a setting such as a school or university.
Figure 1 translates into the following:
. The very poorest 2% of the population with incomes of
less than £36 per week would spend 0.7% of their total
income on the fat tax.
. People in the middle of the income distribution with
incomes around £140 per week would pay around
0.25% of their total income.
. The very richest with incomes above £519 per week
would pay less than 0.1% of their income.
Leicester and Windmeijer13 (p. 15) concluded that:
[T]he very poorest perhaps consume slightly less fat and
cholesterol, but they also have particularly low incomes such
that even a small tax would constitute a fairly high average
tax rate.
While Marshall17 did build a behavioural element into his
calculations, this is absent from the Institute of Fiscal
Studies model so their conclusions need to be treated with
caution as the demand for food is only partially influenced
as a result of price changes. Food is more complicated
than other items such as cigarettes because, for example,
of the wide variety of product substitutes and different
products (e.g. low-fat milk or margarine) available to
consumers. What is clear from the paper is any food tax is
regressive in that it impacts on the poor more than the
well-off, as the proportion of a household budget allocated
to all foods tends to decline with increasing income.
Discussion: policy architecture
There was no evidence of wide-scale use of food taxes at
national government level to influence eating behaviour;
this was in contrast to the use of taxes on food to raise
general revenues. Taxes are levied on food, this is clear,
but the purpose is not as to act as a ‘food tax’ to influence
food behaviour per se, but as a general revenue generator
– as in the case of VAT. Analysis of the limited literature
available shows that ‘food taxes’ could be adopted or used
for any one the following four purposes:
1. To encourage healthy eating by consumers.
2. To diminish the consumption of certain foods or types
of foods, e.g. snack or fast foods.
3. To direct food manufacturers towards the production
and manufacture of more healthy options.
4. As an anti-obesity measure.
As the obesity crisis grows, calls for a tax to halt obesity
have become more vocal. The calls for a tax on ‘unhealthy
foods’ have taken place against a background of
increasing expenditure among all groups, including
children, on snack foods2,4,25. This raises the issue of
taxing categories of foods, such as snack foods, as
opposed to making decisions purely on their nutrient or
calorific content. This would allow, at least theoretically,
key behaviours such as snacking to be targeted through
the mechanism of food categories.
Arguments for regulating snack foods come from work
such as that of Cutler et al.26, who using US data locate the
rise in the percentage of overweight or obese adults
(around 40% in the early 1960s to over 60% in 1999) to an
increase in eating between meals, a decline in the quality of
nutrient intake, and the low cost of many snack and energy-
dense foodstuffs. Much snacking is in the form of energy-
dense and processed high-fat foods, and these are one of
the categories of food that many advocate should be taxed.
Similarly, data from UK market research shows that of nine
million young consumers, only 4% do not engage in
snacking after school. In part this may be explained by the
wide availability and cheap cost of snack foods and the
increased spending power of children. Mintel27 said that:
In a relatively expansive economy, the level of children’s
pocket money increased significantly during the second half
Fig. 1 Distribution effects of a ‘fat tax’ (from Leicester and
Windmeijer13 based on calculations from the National Food Survey)
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of the 1990s and into the new millennium. Wall’s Monitor,
which tracks trends in pocket money, indicates that children,
on average, have around £6.50 weekly to spend (2001 data).
The older, more independent school child who is able travel
home from school alone thus has the means to purchase
snack items in addition – or as an alternative to –
consuming snacks provided for him/her at home.
National Statistics in the UK reported on the consumer
power of young children, with those aged 7–15 years
spending £12.30 per week on average28. Girls were more
likely than boys to spend their money on clothing and
footwear, and personal goods, such as toiletries and
cosmetics. Boys were more likely than girls to spend their
money on food and non-alcoholic drinks, and leisure
goods, such as computer games, CDs and videos. But both
groups spent up to one-third of their money on food and
drink outside the home. Figure 2 gives a breakdown of
these spending patterns. More recent data from the UK
showed that the amount children spend on the way to
school has increased to £1.01 from 77p in 2002 and a
further 74p is spent on the way home; the majority of this is
spent on the four Cs of ‘confectionery, chocolate, crisps
and canned drinks’. This out-of-school spend can be
contrasted with the amount provided by parents to pay for
school meals, which is £1.8429. Much of this is used to
justify the imposition of taxes or restrictions on snack
foods, but the evidence for the impact of such taxes is
rarely considered.
The application of taxation to categories of food as
opposed to the nutrient content of the food itself is a
pragmatic approach to difficult measurement issues and is
often based on the notion that snacks, soft drinks and at
least some foods sold from fast-food outlets are
unnecessary or do not constitute basic needs. Jacobsen
and Brownell15 make the point that:
[L]egislative bodies find it more practical to tax well-recognised
categories of food that play little useful role in nutrition. Soft
drinks and snack foods typically add unneeded calories to the
diet or replace nutritious foods, such as low-fat milk or fruit,
without providing significant levels of nutrients.
The imposition of food taxes seems to be easier in
controlled situations such as schools or canteens. Findings
from a systemised review of food in schools confirm that
taste, convenience and price were the prime determinants
of children’s food choice30. Manipulation of all three is
important if food choice is to be influenced. So within
closed systems such as canteens in workplaces or schools
it may be possible to experiment with subsidies for health
foods and ‘taxes’ on unhealthy ones. This makes us think
that the best application of pricing control is within closed
systems such as hospitals, workplaces and schools, where
incentives (subsidies) and availability can be balanced
with deterrents (taxes/higher costs).
Of course, policy development is only partially driven
by evidence; the appeal and political consequences of any
policy are also important for any government, as are the
practicalities of implementation and enforcement. Brow-
nell and Horgen20 suggest that:
[T]axation as a deterrent to behaviour is less appealing than
using tax revenues to encourage positive changes.
However, they seem to base this assumption on the
political appeal (or otherwise) of food taxes rather than
empirical evidence as to their direct impact on behaviour.
The House of Commons Select Committee4 also came to a
similar understanding when they concluded (p. 64) that:
[I]ncreases to the prices of unhealthy foods need to be
balanced by the introduction of measures to lower the price of
healthy foods, making them affordable to all.
Such comments point to the lack of political will to
implement food taxes. Such political unwillingness can be
attributed to two key influences – the power of the food
industry and the suggested regressive nature of any tax and
the fear that it may impact on the poor more than the
rich13,15,20.
Calls for the use of food taxes as anti-obesity measures,
we suggest, are not sufficiently focused, and what is
proposed is often done without due weight being given to
the mechanisms by which food taxes might operate and
the decisions that individual consumers make in food
choice. Taxation can be used in either a direct or an
indirect way to influence choice. Price is certainly one
issue in food choice, but far from the only one.
For the food industry, the reality is that ‘good’ foods are
bad commodities with low profit margins while ‘bad’
foods are good commodities with high margins31.
Food growing, the food industry and government policy
and subsidies, as well as existing taxation systems, support
an unhealthy food system. Simply taxing the end product
Fig. 2 Expenditure of children aged 7–15 years, percentage of
income spent on different goods (from National Statistics28)
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may be insufficient; there is a need to look at the whole
food chain from farm through production to distribution in
order to ensure that any system of food taxes is systematic
and sustainable32. Taxes may be better applied directly to
production or manufacturing to encourage producers and
manufacturers to change their processes, although it is
likely that such taxes would still be passed on to the
consumer. A report from UBS Warburg33 notes that
businesses such as soft drinks bottlers already pay
business and other taxes, and that an additional tax on
their product is unfair and discriminatory, anti-competitive
and anti-business. The same report reiterates the
regressive and unpopular nature of such taxes with
voters, suggests that the implementation of such taxes
increases bureaucracy, and concludes that:
The introduction of new taxes is always unpopular.
Regulating advertising and marketing and labelling is
politically less sensitive and, in our view, is a more likely
route initially.
Similarly, the JP Morgan16 report on obesity rates the
likelihood of food taxes being implemented as low
compared with further restrictions on labelling and
advertising. In a forecasting report on the food industry
and fat, Curry and Kelnar maintain that the industry is
currently dominated by addressing policy issues related to
obesity by disputing critical research and commissioning
their own, as opposed to wide-scale changes or
diversifying product lines34.
As shown above, several food tax schemes have been
withdrawn as a result of industry pressure and popular
concern. Although there is an undoubted regressive impact
of a food tax, the full implications havenot been trialled and
are poorly understood. Influencing food pricing may also
involve lowering the price of healthy foods, rather than a
sole focus on increasing the price of less healthy ones, and
little is currently known about the impact of such an
approach across income levels. According to Leicester and
Windmeijer13, unless the tax makes the food more
expensive than a desirable alternative – rather than merely
slightly less expensive – any behavioural outcome is likely
to be muted. There is also the assumption that a switch from
amore taxed (and therefore expensive) food is informedby
the individual knowing what the alternatives are. This
assumes that food choice is based on a rational ordered
approach. In fact, decisions around food choice are often
made using a range of complex processes35.
The imposition of food taxes is often promoted as one
way of raising revenue for specific health promotion or
social marketing activities (hypothecated revenues). Our
argument against such hypothecated initiatives is that such
an approach would be largely ameliorative as opposed to
preventive and is a reaction to the promotion of unhealthy
foods. Their importance could, however, be symbolic and
be about a clear public health message. Initiatives such as
social marketing campaigns funded from such revenue
could not hope to compete with any real weight against
food industry marketing on a £ for £ or e for e basis, and it is
likely that the funded programmes would focus down-
stream on the individual consumer rather than upstream on
the food companies dominating unhealthy production and
marketing in the food system. This focus on downstream
approaches36 suits the industry philosophy of focusing on
the individual. The lessons from tobacco control suggest
that hypothecated funding needs to be used to tackle
structural issues such as growing practices and not just
spent on health education campaigns37. The food industry
inevitably complains about contributing to campaigns
which it sees as anti-competitive38.
Conclusions
The lessons from this overview of food taxes for policy
implementation are that:
. Small taxes with clear and unambiguous intent used to
promote the health of key groups, such as children, are
more likely to receive public support; although in our
view they may, on their own, be an ineffective means of
tackling the problems with overeating and consumption
of energy-dense foods.
. The food industry is ‘likely’ to oppose any idea of taxes.
Therefore political commitment to the introduction of
such taxes needs to be clearly stated and agreed.
. The focus of many taxed initiatives is unclear, although
they are generally aimed at the end consumer. Another
focus could be food manufacturers, using taxes and
subsidies (stick and carrot approaches) to encourage
them to produce healthier foods.
. Food taxes as a stand-alone initiative to counteract
obesity are likely to fail. They are, on their own, a simple
solution to a complex problem. They should be
considered alongside other policy initiatives such as
restructuring of food subsidies though mechanisms
such as the Common Agricultural Policy and restrictions
on advertising. It is not just food taxes that need to be
considered but also the corresponding issue of
subsidising the growth, production and consumption
of healthier foods.
. More research is needed on the impact of food taxes on
food choice especially among low-income consumers,
children and the area of impulse and snack buying.
. Taxing food (and subsidies) should be considered
within closed systems such as schools, canteens and the
workplace. The evidence for such approaches has some
basis in the literature.
. The purpose of a food tax can be based on a population
approach as opposed to an initiative designed to change
individual behaviour. Food taxes imposed on
food manufacturing could influence the production of
foodstuffs, which could have a population effect. Further
considerationneeds tobegiven to this aspect of food taxes.
M Caraher and G Cowburn1248
We conclude that the focus on a ‘food tax’ may be
misplaced and instead recommend looking at pricing
policies that have the dual impact of discouraging key
behaviours and encouraging others – in other words, a
mix of ‘taxes’ and subsidies.
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